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Over the last half decade there has been a growing move to apply the methods and
theory of cognitive development to questions regarding infants’ social understanding.
Though this combination has afforded exciting opportunities to better understand
our species’ unique social cognitive abilities, the resulting findings do not always
lead to the same conclusions. For example, a growing body of research has found
support for both universal similarity and individual differences in infants’ social reasoning
about others’ responses to incomplete goals. The present research examines this
apparent contradiction by assessing the influence of attachment security on the
ability of university undergraduates to represent instrumental needs versus social-
emotional distress. When the two varieties of goals were clearly differentiated, we
observed a universally similar pattern of results (Experiments 1A/B). However, when
the goals were combined, and both instrumental need and social-emotional distress
were presented together, individual differences emerged (Experiments 2 and 3). Taken
together, these results demonstrate that by integrating the two perspectives of shared
universals and individual differences, important points of contact can be revealed
supporting a deeper, more nuanced understanding of the nature of human social
reasoning.
Keywords: social-cognitive development, social development, cognitive development, social evaluation,
attachment, prosocial behavior
Introduction
Humans are unique in the integral role that social relationships play in our success as a species
(e.g., Brewer and Caporael, 2006). As a result, there is considerable interest in understanding
how individuals come to understand, engage with, and navigate their social environment.
Though historically social development and cognitive development were viewed as integrally
intertwined (e.g., Piaget, 1945/1995; Vygotsky, 1978; see also, Dweck, 2013), for decades these
two lines of inquiry have been pursued largely independently; with social developmentalists
typically examining how variability in experiences leads to differences in well-being while
cognitive developmentalists typically examine commonalities in the content and development of
children’s minds. Recently these two perspectives have been reunited (e.g.,Olson and Dweck,
2008, 2009; Dweck, 2013). This integration has helped build important points of contact between
a variety of sub-disciplines of psychology, however in doing so, it has become apparent that
sometimes studies which appear to address highly similar questions may lead to quite different
conclusions.
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Variability in the Consistency of Social Reasoning
One area where similar studies have led to different conclusions
is within the domain of social reasoning. Specifically, a
recent explosion of interest in children’s reasoning about
others—particularly within the domain of other-oriented
behavior—has led to a body of literature in which infants’
representation of positive versus negative interactions (e.g.,
Premack and Premack, 1997), preferences for helpers versus
hinderers (e.g., Hamlin et al., 2007), and expectations following
prosocial versus antisocial interactions (e.g., Kuhlmeier et al.,
2003; Johnson et al., 2007) appear to support both universal
consistency and individual differences (e.g., Johnson et al., 2013).
Universal Expectations of Helpers and Hinderers
One line of research utilizes the “helper/hinderer paradigm”
to examine infants’ reasoning about others’ responses to
instrumental needs and finds a single pattern of common
expectations. In these studies, infants watch a brief animation
of small ball (the “Climber”) trying and failing to reach the top
of a steep hill. On alternating trials, one of two similarly sized
shapes (typically a triangle and square) comes down and either
pushes the Climber to the top of the hill (the “Helper”) or pushes
the Climber to the bottom of the hill (the “Hinderer”). Across
a variety of dependent measures, infants appear surprisingly
consistent in their expectations of, and preferences for, helpful
versus hindering characters.
In the original version of the helper/hinderer paradigm, after
infants were habituated to the climb, they were shown the three
characters interacting in a novel context. By 12 months, infants
differentiated between scenes in which the Climber approached
the Helper versus the Hinderer and preferred the video in which
the Climber approached the Helper (Kuhlmeier et al., 2003). This
preference was consistent with pilot adult participants’ tendency
to report seeing “the ball as ‘liking’ or ‘preferring’ the helper
object” (Kuhlmeier et al., 2003, p. 402). And, although the
participants varied in the degree to which they differentiated
between the two types of approach, infants who showed the
largest difference in attention to the generally preferred (approach
Helper) over non-preferred (approachHinderer) outcome showed
more advanced theory of mind at 4 years than infants who show
smaller, or reversed, differences in attention (Yamaguchi et al.,
2009); suggesting that this preference was not only shared across
individuals but was also associated with relatively more mature
social cognitive development.
More recent research finds that infants not only differentiate
between these two varieties of approach, but also actively predict
them. Using eye-tracking methodology, 12-month-old infants’
anticipatory looks were recorded while they observed the Climber
ambiguously approaching the Helper or Hinderer. Twelve out of
17 infants (70.5%) predicted that the Climber would approach
the Helper as opposed to the Hinderer (Fawcett and Liszkowski,
2012). Moreover, when given the opportunity to choose between
the Helper and Hinderer, 12 out of 12 (100%) 6-month-olds
and 14 out of 16 (87.5%) 10-month-olds preferred the Helper
(Experiment 1, Hamlin et al., 2007; see also Hamlin, 2014 for a
replication of this finding). Together, these studies converge to
suggest that when evaluating others’ responses to instrumental
needs, most infants prefer helpers to hinderers and expect others
to feel similarly. Indeed, these results are so striking that they have
been used as evidence in support of the existence of a universal,
innate moral core (Hamlin, 2013).
Individual Differences in Expectations of Caregivers
In contrast, when infants’ reasoning about others’ responses
to social emotional distress have been investigated utilizing
a “caregiver paradigm”, the results appear to support robust
individual differences in expectations (Johnson et al., 2007, 2010).
Utilizing a similar experimental design (i.e., visual habituation),
and strikingly similar abstract, animated agents (i.e., a small ball
struggling to climb a steep hill) studies find that, around their first
birthday, infants’ expectations of and preferences for responsive
versus unresponsive caregivers reflect multiple distinct patterns
of expectations rooted in personal caregiving experiences.
In these studies, infants are habituated to a large “Mommy” ball
climbing a steep hill and leaving her “Baby” at the bottom, crying
and unable to follow. Despite clear similarities to the previously
described studies, infants’ expectations of, and preferences for,
responsive versus unresponsive caregivers varied as a function of
personal attachment style. Securely attached infants expected the
Caregiver to return to the Baby, while insecurely attached infants
expected the Caregiver to ignore the distressed Baby (Johnson
et al., 2007; Study 1, Johnson et al., 2010). When the infants
were subsequently presented with a video of the Baby alternately
approaching a responsive versus unresponsive Mommy, securely
attached infants expected the Baby to prefer the responsive
Mommy whereas insecurely attached infants expected the Baby
to prefer the unresponsive Mommy (Study 3, Johnson et al.,
2010). Finally, when infants were shown a partially responsive
Mommy (who comes part-way back down the hill to meet the
distressed Baby) securely attached infants expected that the Baby
would approach the Mommy while insecurely attached infants
differed in their expectations based on their unique variety of
attachment insecurity. Like securely attached infants, insecure-
resistant infants were surprised when the Baby moved further
away from the partially responsive Mommy, whereas insecure-
avoidant infants were surprised when the Baby approached a
partially responsive Mommy (Study 2, Johnson et al., 2010).
Together, these findings suggest that relatively stable, early
emerging individual differences exert an important influence on
the representation and processing of valenced social interactions
(Johnson et al., 2007, 2010).
As these two lines of research address common theoretical
questions using similar methodologies and stimuli, yet produce
different patterns of empirical findings, we are left with an
important question regarding how to integrate these results. One
explanation is that we only see what we are looking for. It is
possible that the helper/hinderer paradigm (e.g., Kuhlmeier et al.,
2003; Hamlin et al., 2007) finds universal similarity in reasoning
simply because sub-groupswere not analyzed. This seems unlikely
given that, where counts are available, between 70.5% (Fawcett
and Liszkowski, 2012) and 100% (Hamlin et al., 2007) of infants
showed similar expectations and preferences in helper/hinderer
paradigm yet, only about half of infant samples are securely
attached (e.g., 10 out of 21 infants in Johnson et al., 2007; 14 out of
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30 infants in Johnson et al., 2010, Study 2; and 20 out of 35 infants
in Johnson et al., 2010, Study 3). Moreover, when the responses
of the securely and insecurely attached infants were collapsed
in the caregiver paradigm, results were not distinguishable from
chance (see Johnson et al., 2013). This suggests that the different
patterns of results across the two varieties of studies are not simply
a reflection of different analytical choices.
An alternative explanation is that these two sets of studies,
though superficially similar, actually tap into different underlying
representations. Although both sets of studies show a small ball
struggling to achieve a goal that is either supported (i.e., when the
Helper pushes the Climber up the hill or the Mommy responds to
the Baby’s distress) or thwarted (i.e., when the Hinderer pushes
the Climber down the hill or the Mommy ignores the Baby’s
distress), the two sets of studies may require the attribution of
different varieties, or at least complexities, of goals leading to
differences in subsequent representations and expectations. In the
helper/hinderer studies (e.g., Kuhlmeier et al., 2003), one must
represent the Climber’s instrumental goal (i.e., “get up the hill”) in
order to interpret and evaluate the subsequent social interactions
(i.e., helping versus hindering). In contrast, in the caregiving
paradigm (e.g., Johnson et al., 2007), one must represent the
Baby’s social-emotional goal (i.e., “get to Mommy”) in order
to interpret and evaluate the subsequent social interaction (i.e.,
responsive versus unresponsive caregiving). Thus, the similar
social expectations assessed at test may rely on different initial
goal representations and it is this initial willingness or ability to
represent the target ball’s goal that may affect the consistency with
which social reasoning occurs.
Although both lines of research aim to understand how
individuals reason about agents in their environment, it is possible
that the different patterns of results reflect important asymmetries
in the way individual differences influence our representations
of, and expectations about, the goals pursued by others (see also,
Johnson et al., 2013) with one set of studies (those employing the
helper/hinderer paradigm) relying on the ability to first represent
the instrumental goal of an agent (theClimber) acting on an object
(the hill) and the other (those employing the caregiver paradigm)
relying on the ability to represent the social-emotional goal of
an agent (the Baby) acting on another agent (the Mommy; see
Spelke, 2014, for a similar distinction). In other words, these two
varieties of stimuli may require that participants first represent
two different types of goals (i.e., instrumental versus social-
emotional) before they can reason about the subsequent social
interactions and it is at the level of goal representation that the
participants may vary.
Reconciling Differences
The present research attempts to understand why there appears
to be both universal similarities and individual differences in
the way individuals reason about those who respond positively
versus negatively to others’ unfulfilled goals. By utilizing methods
and theory from developmental, social, and cognitive psychology
we will examine the extent to which these apparent differences
can be understood by examining the types of goals individuals
are initially representing when observing these abstract, stylized,
animated interactions. Critically, because human infants are
limited in the types of responses they can provide, and previous
research suggests that there is likely continuity in the way
these videos are perceived across the lifespan (see Kuhlmeier
et al., 2003), we will examine this question in a much older
participant population, namely university undergraduates. In a
series of three experiments, utilizing both free-response and
eye tracking methodologies, we will examine how attachment
security affects the way university undergraduates represent and
discuss two varieties of incomplete goals: instrumental need
(e.g., agents acting on objects; e.g., Kuhlmeier et al., 2003) and
social-emotional distress (e.g., agents acting with agents; e.g.,
Johnson et al., 2010). In doing so, we aim to demonstrate how the
observation of apparent contradictions can help us to develop a
more nuanced understanding of the nature of social reasoning.
Attachment Security
Early experiences within the caregiver–child dyad are thought to
result in internal working models of relationships that organize
and bias subsequent social-emotional processing (Bowlby,
1969/1982). Individuals who are securely attached readily
approach relationship partners, openly share their needs, and
expect that close others will accept and respond appropriately
to their distress. In contrast, individuals who are insecurely
attached typically avoid or resist their relationship partners and
expect close others to reject their needs or respond unpredictably
(Ainsworth et al., 1978; De Wolff and van Ijzendoorn, 1997;
Cassidy and Shaver, 2008). For decades, researchers have
examined the influence of these internal working models of
attachment on individuals’ social development, demonstrating
that from infancy to adulthood, early experiences in the
caregiver–child dyad exert reliable and robust influences on
social processing, representation, and behavior (e.g., Main et al.,
1985; Dykas and Cassidy, 2011).
Though it is clear that variability in internal working models
of attachment affect a number of social-emotional outcomes,
what is less clear is where these differences originate. Historically,
researchers have examined the link between objective differences
in caregiving and attachment security. From this perspective,
researchers have found that infants who receive responsive
caregiving are considerably more likely to be securely attached
than infants who do not (DeWolff and van Ijzendoorn, 1997). Yet,
despite the reliability of this finding, variability in the quality of
parenting received only accounts for a minority of the observed
variance in attachment security. It has recently been proposed
that the objective quality of the parenting that the infant receives
is less important than the infant’s subjective construal of their
experiences (Johnson and Chen, 2011). Specifically, individual
differences in attachment can be thought to result not from
objective differences in social emotional experiences, but from
the way these experiences are subjectively construed as a function
of individual differences in oxytocin receptor (OXTR) genes.
In human infants, it appears as though variability in OXTR
influences both attention to emotionally salient stimuli and
attachment security (Johnson and Chen, 2011), suggesting that
stable differences in attachment are not simply related to the
experiences one has, but to the manner in which one perceives
those experiences. Though both accounts posit that variability
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in attachment security reflects differences in the experience of
early caregiving, they differ in regards to whether it is the care
received or the construal of the care that biases subsequent social-
emotional information processing.
Prosocial Behavior
In a related line of research examining the development of
other-oriented behavior, there is growing consensus that humans
recognize and respond to a variety of problems experienced
by others, ranging from relatively simple, emotion-neutral
instrumental needs to relatively complex, highly emotional
distress (e.g., Dunfield, 2014; Eisenberg et al., 2015). The ability
to respond to each of these different types of problems appears to
emerge at different ages (e.g., Dunfield et al., 2011) and develop
independently of each other (e.g., Svetlova et al., 2010; Dunfield
and Kuhlmeier, 2013; Paulus et al., 2013). Together, these findings
have led to the proposal that recognizing instrumental need
relies on different underlying representations than recognizing
emotional distress (e.g., Warneken and Tomasello, 2009; Svetlova
et al., 2010; Dunfield, 2014).
Acting effectively on behalf of another requires the ability to
represent the problem that the individual is facing, the ability
to recognize the required intervention, and the motivation to
help alleviate the problem. Recent research supports this position
finding that early helping is dependent on children’s abilities
to represent stable, abstract goals in others (Hobbs and Spelke,
2015). Yet not all goals are represented with equal ease. Infants
represent action goals such as reaching before they understand
more mentalistic goals such as using a point to direct attention
(Woodward et al., 2001). Relatedly, when examining the literature
on the development of the different types of evaluations that may
underlie different varieties of prosocial behavior, the ability to
represent and reason about others’ instrumental goals appears to
emerge earlier than the ability to reason about others’ emotional
distress (see Dunfield, 2014, for a review). Moreover, these two
varieties of goal attributions are not only dissociable at the
developmental level, but appear to be supported by two distinct
neural systems. While the mirror neuron system supports the
representation of familiar, frequently executed actions based on
low-level behavioral input, the metalizing system appears to
support the representation of others’ thoughts and beliefs on the
basis of social intelligence (Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009).
Finally, these differences in underlying representations affect the
ease with which children respond to others’ needs. Although
children begin engaging in instrumental help as early as 14months
(Warneken and Tomasello, 2007), social-emotional helping (i.e.,
getting another’s attention on behalf of a third-party) develops
much later (closer to 3 years) and is less frequent and robust (i.e.,
16 out of 32 toddlers helping in social tasks versus 29 out of 32
toddlers helping instrumental tasks, Experiment 1; Beier et al.,
2014). Together, it is clear that there is considerable heterogeneity
in the ability to represent the problems that others face and that
these differences affect when and how individuals act on behalf of
others.
Critically, attachment security should not necessarily bias
the representation of all goals equally. While securely attached
individuals have a positive self-construal and feel confident in
their ability to accept others’ needs for closeness, sympathy, and
support, insecurely attached individuals typically do not. As such,
variations in attachment security should exert a greater influence
on tasks that require the interpretation of more emotionally
laden social stimuli than less emotional instrumental stimuli (see
Dykas and Cassidy, 2011, for a review). Because instrumental
needs are based on the ability to reason about agents acting
on objects, while social-emotional distress requires the ability
and willingness to represent another’s negative emotions and
social relationships, the ability and willingness to reason about
social emotional distress should be uniquely affected by internal
working models of attachment. Thus the apparent contradiction
in the developmental literature investigating social reasoning may
reflect the fact that representing instrumental need is distinct from
representing social-emotional distress and the latter shows more
variability because it activates, and is influenced by, the social
schema that underlie attachment security (e.g., Johnson et al.,
2013). However, because attachment security affects attention to,
processing of, and the ability to discuss emotionally laden social
stimuli, the mechanism through which attachment security will
exert its influence is not presently clear.
Current Study
In order to better understand variability in social reasoning
and provide explanatory insight into the apparent contradiction
between universal similarity and individual differences in social
cognition, we asked university undergraduates to describe a
variety of abstract, animated social interactions that were based
on the two original hill stimuli (e.g., Kuhlmeier et al., 2003;
Johnson et al., 2007). Specifically, we created three brief videos
in which a small yellow ball interacted with a large yellow ball
and a hill. To disentangle the role of attachment security on the
processing of different types of goals, we systematically varied the
interaction between the two balls and the hill in order to afford
participants the opportunity to discuss both the instrumental (the
ball is trying to get up the hill), and social-emotional (the ball is
trying to get the attention of, or in proximity to, a social partner)
aspects of the interaction.We predicted that if attachment security
differentially biases the processing of instrumental needs versus
social-emotional distress, then: (1) both securely and insecurely
attached participants will discuss instrumental goals similarly
(Study 1A); (2) insecurely attached participants will tend to avoid
discussing social goals (Study 1B), particularly when the stimuli
are complex or ambiguous (Study 2); and (3) any variability in
the tendency to report social goals across the two groups will
be associated with an attentional bias that is consistent with the
underlying attachment representations (Study 3).
Study 1A
The goal of Study 1 was to determine if individual differences
in attachment security affected participants’ recognition of
instrumental need versus social-emotional distress. Across two
studies, two groups of participants watched as a small ball
struggled to complete either an instrumental “hill” goal (Study
1A) or an emotional “social” goal (Study 1B). In both videos,
the small ball was separated from a larger ball. However, the
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videos varied regarding what the little ball was attempting to do.
Specifically, in Study 1A (instrumental), the small ball tries but
fails to climb the hill, whereas in Study 1B (social), the small
ball tries but fails to get the larger ball’s attention. By presenting
two separate groups of participants with the two types of goals
independently, we can begin to determine the extent to which
attachment security imposes an absolute limit on the processing
of social stimuli.
Method
The Office of Responsible Research Practices at the Ohio
State University approved all of the research reported in this
manuscript.
Participants
Ninety-one undergraduate students (39 female) enrolled in an
Introductory Psychology course participated for partial course
credit.
Measures
Participants were shown a brief (20 s) animated video in which
a small yellow ball attempts to climb a relatively steep hill while
a larger ball looks on (Figure 1A). The small ball makes two
attempts at ascent separated by a “sigh” in which the small ball
expands and contracts while darkening in color. Both balls had
faces but maintained a neutral expression. Following the video,
participants were given a small piece of paper and asked to briefly
describe what they thought the video was about.
After the participants described the video, they completed the
Experiences in Close Relationships questionnaire (ECR; Brennan
et al., 1998), which measures attachment security along two
dimensions, namely anxiety and avoidance. Attachment anxiety
refers to the concern that others will be unavailable in times of
need (e.g., “I worry about being abandoned”), while attachment
avoidance refers to the tendency to avoid potential pain by
keeping others at a distance (e.g., “I feel comfortable sharing my
private thoughts and feelings withmy partner”). Participants were
asked to think about their close relationships in general, without
focusing on a specific partner, and rate the extent to which each
statement accurately reflects their feelings.
Coding
To determine if there were individual differences in the types of
goals that the participants attributed, we developed a single coding
scheme that we applied consistently across all three free-response
studies. First we coded for the presence of any goal directed
language. Participants were given a general “goal” code if they
used agentive language such as “trying,” “wanting,” “attempting,”
or “failing.” Next, we categorized the specific types of goals
that the participants identified. Of particular interest was the
participants’ tendency to discuss the instrumental (hill) goal
and the social (reunion) goal. Hill goals were coded when the
participant indicated that the small ball was trying to get up the hill
(e.g., “a small circle tried to go up a hill but failed”). Social goals
were coded when participants explicitly referred to either a social
partner (e.g., a mother, parent, or friend) or a social behavior
FIGURE 1 | Schematics of study displays. (A) Study 1A: hill video; (B)
Study 1B: social video; (C) Study 2: combined video; (D) Study 3: outcome
scenes.
(e.g., “get attention”) as the small ball’s target. To allow for a more
nuanced understanding of the effect of attachment security on the
types of goals people represent, these codes were not mutually
exclusive. Participants who discussed both goals were given both
codes (e.g., “a baby trying to climb the hill to reach his parent”).
Some participants discussed the small ball’s behavior in terms of
goals that were not related to either the hill or other agent (e.g.,
“trying to get what you want is not as easy as you think”). These
participants received a goal code, but neither of the specific codes.
A secondary coder, blind to attachment status and the purpose of
the study, coded all of the responses. Agreement was near perfect
for goals (96%, k = 0.92), hills (96%, k = 0.87), and social goals
(94% k= 0.86).
Results and Discussion
Attachment Classification
To examine whether individual differences in attachment security
affects the attribution of goals to others, and to allow comparison
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to the developmental literature, we created two groups of
participants based on their ECR scores (Brennan et al., 1998).
Though there are many ways to classify attachment security, we
chose to create two groups for our main analysis because the most
comparable infant condition found that expectations regarding
the Mommy’s behavior (responsive versus unresponsive) differed
between securely and insecurely attached infants but did not
differ between varieties of insecurely attached infants (see Johnson
et al., 2007; Study 1 Johnson et al., 2010). In our sample,
the secure group includes individuals who were low on both
attachment anxiety and avoidance (N = 22, 24.2%, 11 female)
and represents individuals who are likely to process both
instrumental and social information in an open and relatively
accurate manner. In contrast, the insecure group includes
participants who are high on one, or both, of the dimensions
of attachment insecurity (N = 69, 75.8%, 28 female). These
individuals are hypothesized to have more negative expectations
regarding others’ tendency to seek and accept comfort and are
expected to interpret social information in a biased and selective
manner. Both attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance were
significantly higher in the insecure group than the secure group
[anxiety, t(89) = 6.72, p < 0.001; avoidance, t(89) = 6.00,
p< 0.001].
Verbal Reports
When presented with unambiguous instrumental goals, there
were no group-based differences in the tendency to report goals
[$2(1, N = 91) = 0.05, p = 0.82, 0 = 0.02], nor in the types of
goals reported [hill: $2(1, N = 91) = 1.12, p = 0.29, 0 = 0.11;
social: $2(1, N = 91)= 1.69, p= 0.19, 0 = 0.14; Figure 2A]1.
Consistent with our predictions, we observed universal
similarity in the ability to represent and discuss instrumental
goals. When an agent appears to be unsuccessfully acting on an
object (in this case a steep hill), attachment security exerts little
influence on the ability to represent the underlying goal. Study
1B extends this finding by examining individual differences in
the representation and reporting of social goals.
Study 1B
To determine if variability in the universality of social reasoning
is related to differences in the underlying goal representations,
particularly when the goals are social, Study 1B presented
participants with a video designed to reflect a purely social
problem (in this case, a Mommy abandoning her baby).
Method
Participants
Ninety undergraduate students (50 female) enrolled in an
Introductory Psychology course, who did not participate in
Study 1A, participated for partial course credit. Three additional
participants were tested but excluded from analysis for failure to
complete all measures.
1We conducted the same analyses treating the three varieties of attachment
insecurity separately and observe the identical pattern of results: Goals: $2(3,
N = 91) = 1.2, p = 0.75, 0 = 0.11; Hill: $2(3, N = 91) = 3.90, p = 0.27,
0= 0.21; Social: $2(3, N = 91)= 3.15, p= 0.37, 0= 0.19.
FIGURE 2 | Results of Studies lA–2. The bars represent the proportion of
participants reporting any goals (left panel), and the specific goals of interest
(right panel). (A) Study 1A: hill video; (B) Study 1B: social video; (C) Study 2:
combined video. The “*” indicates the difference is significant at p < 0.05.
Measures
Study 1B was largely identical to Study 1A with the exception that
the video was modified to reflect a single social-emotional goal
(Figure 1B). Instead of attempting to climb the hill, the small ball
turned to look at the larger ball and then engaged in a series of
expansions and contractions, associated with a darkening of color,
intended to represent distress. Goals were coded as described in
Study 1A. A secondary blind coder coded all reports; agreement
was near perfect for goals (100%, k= 1), hill (98%, k= 0.98), and
social (96%, k = 0.83). After watching and describing the videos,
participants completed the ECR.
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Results and Discussion
Attachment Classification
Relative to secure participants (N = 21, 23.3%, 12 female),
insecure participants (N = 69, 76.7%, 38 female) had lower
attachment anxiety and avoidance: anxiety [t(88) = 5.47,
p< 0.001] and avoidance [t(88) = 6.52, p< 0.001].
Verbal Reports
Despite being presented with a purely social interaction, there
were no attachment related differences in the tendency to report
goals [$2(1, N = 90) = 2.13, p = 0.15, 0 = 0.15], nor in the
specific goals reported [hill: $2(1, N = 90) = 0.31, p = 0.58,
0 = 0.05; social: $2(1, N = 90) = 0.85, p = 0.35, 0 = 0.10;
Figure 2B]2.
Study 1B replicates and extends the findings of Study 1A by
demonstrating that when presented with pure and unambiguous
goals, individuals make the same attributions regardless of
goal type or attachment categorization. Though these findings
appear to suggest that differences in attachment security do not
differentially influence the ability to represent instrumental versus
social goals, because social schemas, such as internal working
models of attachment, are particularly likely to bias processing
when stimuli are complex or ambiguous (e.g., Baldwin, 1992;
Johnson et al., 2013) it is possible that separating the two goals
and presenting them independently and unambiguously diluted
the effect.
Consistent with the proposal that schemas have a greater
influence on the representation of ambiguous stimuli, Johnson
et al. (2007, 2010) first documented individual differences in
social reasoning when both the hill and social goal were presented
together. Unlike our pure videos, the original caregiver paradigm
showed the Mommy distressing the Baby by climbing up a steep
hill, affording both an instrumental (the baby simply cannot get
up the hill) and social-emotional (the baby is distressed because
it cannot get to its Mommy) problems. Given this design, it is
possible that different participants were attending to different
aspects of interaction. To address this consideration, and explore
the extent to which attachment security affects the interpretation
of complex/ambiguous problems, we modified our videos to make
themmore similar to Johnson et al. (2007). Specifically, we created
a new video in which both the hill and social goals were equally
salient.
Study 2
Study 2 aimed to determine if individual differences in attachment
security affected participants’ recognition of instrumental need
versus social-emotional distress in complex scenes. To that end,
participants watched a video that included both the instrumental
“hill” goal of Kuhlmeier et al. (2003), and the social “reunion”
goal of Johnson et al. (2010). Because the video was complex and
included both an instrumental and social goal, we predicted that
although all participants should be able to recognize goal directed
2Again, the pattern of results remains the same when the three varieties
of attachment insecurity are treated as separate groups: Goals: $2(3,
N = 90) = 2.31, p = 0.51, 0 = 0.16; Hill: $2(3, N = 90) = 3.32, p = 0.34,
0= 0.19; Social: $2(3, N = 90)= 1.25, p= 0.74, 0= 0.12.
behavior, and both groups of participants should be equally likely
to discuss the instrumental goal, insecurely attached individuals
will avoid reporting the social goal because this video, unlike the
pure social video, affords this option.
Method
Participants
Ninety-three undergraduate students (45 female) enrolled in an
Introductory Psychology course participated for partial course
credit. One additional student participated in the study but failed
to complete all the measures and was removed from subsequent
analysis.
Measures
Largely identical to the previous two studies, the only
modification was the content of the videos. Specifically, we
moved the large ball from the bottom of the hill to the top
thus combining the small ball’s instrumental and social goals
(Figure 1C). In order to make both varieties of goals equally
salient, and comparable to Studies 1A/B, the small ball attempts
to climb the hill once, expands and contracts once, then, at the
bottom of the hill, expands and darkens in color, appearing to cry.
The larger ball remains motionless at the top of the hill for the
duration of the video. Consistent with the previous videos, both
balls had faces but maintained a neutral expression. Following
the video participants completed the ECR. Again, all reports were
coded by a secondary, blind coder and agreement was high (97%,
k= 0.79), hill (94%, k= 0.84), and social (98%, k= 0.93).
Results and Discussion
Attachment Classification
Both attachment anxiety and avoidance were lower in the secure
group (N= 29, 31.2%, 11 female) than the insecure group [N= 64,
68.8%, 34 female; anxiety, t(91) = 5.74, p < 0.001; avoidance,
t(91)= 5.98, p< 0.001].
Verbal Reports
Both groups of participants were equally likely to discuss
the ball’s behavior in agentive, goal-directed language [$2(1,
N = 93) = 0.16, p = 0.69, 0 = 0.04; Figure 2C]. Moreover,
both groups were equally likely to recognize and report the
instrumental “hill” goal [$2(1,N = 93)= 1.78, p= 0.18,0= 0.14].
However, consistent with our hypotheses, the groups differed in
their tendency to report the “social” goal [$2(1, N = 93) = 10.89,
p = 0.001, 0 = 0.34]3; specifically, insecurely attached
participants were significantly less likely than securely attached
participants to report the Baby’s social goal of reuniting with the
Mommy.
To determine whether it was attachment insecurity in general
or one of the continuous attachment dimensions in particular
that affected participant’s tendency to report the social goal,
we conducted a logistic regression with attachment anxiety,
avoidance, and their interaction as continuous, independent
3We analyze the three varieties of attachment insecurity separately the pattern
of results is identical: Goals: $2(3, N = 93) = 1.50, p = 0.68, 0 = 0.13; Hill:
$2(3, N = 93) = 3.49, p = 0.32, 0 = 0.19; Social: $2(3, N = 93) = 11.33,
p= 0.01, 0= 0.35.
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predictors. The overall model accounted for a significant portion
of the variance [$2(3, N = 93) = 8.17, p = 0.04]; however,
none of the independent predictors were significant [p’s> 0.154].
Indicating that it is attachment insecurity broadly, as opposed to
either of the specific dimensions that influenced the participants’
tendency to report the social goal.
Study 2 examined the extent to which individual differences in
attachment security affected the representation of two varieties of
goals that varied in their social-emotional content. Differences in
attachment security exerted a greater influence on the processing
of social-emotional than instrumental goals, but only when the
two types of goals were presented together. This result appears
consistent with past research suggesting that insecure attachment
categorically biases social representations irrespective of the
nature of the insecurity (i.e., avoidance or anxiety; see Johnson
et al., 2007, for a similar result). Moreover, these findings support
the proposal that an individual’s pre-existing relationship schema
exerts a greater influence on representations when evaluating
ambiguous, as opposed to clear, stimuli (e.g., Baldwin, 1992).
Though Study 1B rules out the possibility that these results
reflect a general unwillingness of insecurely attached individual
to discuss social emotional needs, it is not clear from these
descriptions whether attachment security is biasing the way
participants are attending to and representing the interaction or
simply the way participants are discussing the interaction. Study 3
uses eye-tracking methodology to determine the extent to which
the differential discussion of social-emotional goals observed in
Study 2 is driven by differences in underlying attention and
representation.
Study 3
Study 3 presented participants with the same stimuli as Study
2, but instead of having them provide a written description,
we presented two outcomes intended to represent the successful
completion of either the hill or social goal. Because infants
have limited verbal abilities, methodologies for assessing mental
representations that do not require verbal responses have become
an invaluable tool to developmental psychologists (see Oakes,
2010, for a comprehensive review of this methodology). Though
visual attention varies greatly across the lifespan (Colombo, 2001),
gaze duration has previously been used in adult populations
to examine attention to, and expectations of, similarly social
stimuli (e.g., Guastella et al., 2008). Further, although it is less
common to utilize looking timemethodologies to assess the social
cognitive representations of adults, doing so allows for a more
direct comparison to the developmental literature that motivated
the current research. Following the logic of infant looking time
designs (e.g., Spelke, 1985), we expect that participants who have
an expectation regarding the ball’s goal will show greater attention
to, and spend more time looking at, the outcome they find
relatively unexpected.
Method
Participants
Two-hundred and twenty-nine undergraduate students (126
female) received partial course credit for participation. Two
additional students participated in the study but failed to complete
the ECR andwere removed from subsequent analysis. Participants
whose Tobii capture rate was less than 75% were also excluded
from further analysis. The final sample included 192 participants
(103 females).
Measures/Procedure
Participants were 5-point calibrated on a Tobii T60 XL eye
tracker. Once calibrated, participants watched the complex video
from Study 2. Participants then saw a flashing central fixation
point followed by two static outcomes presented simultaneously
(Figure 1D). Because the complex video affords two accurate goal
attributions (i.e., hill and social), we created two resolution scenes
that dissociated these two outcomes. In both scenes the large ball
was moved to the bottom of the hill, however, the location of the
small ball varied. In the hill outcome, the small ball was seated atop
the hill, physically separated from the large ball. In contrast, in the
social outcome, the small ball was at the bottom of the hill beside
the large ball. areas of interest (AOIs) were created around both
of the outcomes and total fixation duration during the first 5 s of
presentation was analyzed. Direction of motion (left versus right)
and location of outcome (left versus right) were counterbalanced
between participants. Following the eye-tracking portion of the
study participants completed the ECR.
Results and Discussion
Attachment Classification
Consistent with the previous studies, participants were split into
a secure (N = 67, 34.9%, Female = 34) and insecure group
(N = 125, 65.1%, Female = 68). The securely attached group
had significantly lower anxiety and avoidance than the insecure
group [anxiety, t(190)= 9.26, p< 0.001; avoidance, t(190)= 9.60,
p< 0.001].
No main effects or interactions of gender were observed;
thus it was removed from subsequent analyses. A 2 (outcome:
hill, mom)  2 (security: secure, insecure)  2 (motion: left,
right)  2 (location: left hill, left mom) mixed model analysis
of variance was conducted to determine if the two groups of
participants differentially attended to the two outcomes. There
was a significant main effect of outcome [F(1,184) = 13.47,
p < 0.001, !2p = 0.07], and location [F(1,184) = 5.286, p < 0.023,
!2p = 0.03], and an interaction between outcome, motion, and
location [F(1,184)= 22.75, p< 0.001, !2p = 0.11].
Of particular interest to our research question was the effect
of attachment security on attention to the two outcomes. As
predicted by an attentional bias account, we found a significant
interaction between security and outcome [F(1,184) = 6.795,
p< 0.01,!2p= 0.04;Figure 3]. Securely attached participants spent
significantly more time looking at the hill outcome (M = 1.89,
SD = 0.77) than the social outcome (M = 1.42, SD = 0.63)
whereas, the insecurely attached participants looked equally long
at both the hill (M = 1.72, SD = 0.58) and social outcomes
(M = 1.65, SD = 0.57). Finally, security and outcome interacted
with location [F(1,184) = 6.22, p < 0.01, !2p = 0.03] such that,
securely attached participants showed a main effect of outcome
[F(1,65) = 10.47, p = 0.002, !2p = 0.14] regardless of location
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FIGURE 3 | Participant’s total fixation duration to the instrumental (hill)
versus social (reunion) outcome by attachment security.
The “*” indicates the difference is significant at p < 0.05.
[F(1,65) = 3.12, p < 0.08, !2p = 0.05]. In contrast, insecurely
attached participants showed a marginal interaction between
outcome and location [F(1,123) = 3.75, p < 0.06, !2p = 0.03]
but no main effect of outcome [F(1,123) = 0.92, p = 0.34,
!2p = 0.007]4. Simply put, though securly attached participants
tended to look longer to the hill outcome regardless of where it was
located, insecurely attached participants tended to look longer at
whichever outcome that was closer to the ball’s initial movement,
regardless of its content. A Wilcoxon Signed-rank test revealed
a significant effect of attachment security on preferred outcome
(z= 2.12, p= 0.034), suggesting that the pattern of results is not
simply a function of averaging but instead holds across individual
group members.
Taken together, this pattern of results suggests that securely
attached participants have automatic, robust implicit expectations
regarding the ball’s ultimate goal that supersede task demands.
Consistent with, though stronger than, the verbal responses
observed in Study 2, securely attached participants appear to
represent the hill as a means of achieving the overarching
social goal. Securely attached participants devoted more attention
(operationalized as longer looking) to the hill outcome, where
the ball has successfully overcome a physical barrier but remains
separated from its social partner, than to the social outcome,
where the ball remains at the bottom of the hill but is reunited
with its social partner, suggesting that participants found the
instrumental outcome less expected and requiring of more
attention. In contrast, insecurely attached participants did not
differentiate their attention to either of the outcomes suggesting
that they are either not automatically prioritizing social over
instrumental goals, or are doing so in a manner that is weak and
quickly overwhelmed by the surface characteristics of the stimuli.
Insecurely attached participants did not appear to have a strong
expectation regarding either resolution. Together with Study 2,
these results support the proposal that variability in attachment
security can influence the way we represent others’ goals. When
4The pattern of results largely replicates when attachment insecurity is
separated into three groups, however the interaction between ECR and
outcome falls from significant to trending [F(1,176) = 2.40, p < 0.07,
!2p = 0.04].
participants process complex social interactions that afford a
number of different construals, the ease with which an individual
approaches and interacts with their social environment can bias
the representation of social-emotional goals particularly when the
social goals are ambiguous and paired with a less emotionally
evocative instrumental goal.
General Discussion
The overarching goal of the present research was to begin
to address the question of why some early social reasoning
appears universal, while some shows marked individual
differences. Specifically, using both free-response and eye-
tracking methodologies, we attempted to bridge two related
domains of literature examining attachment security and
other-oriented behavior in order to determine if this apparent
contradiction could serve as a starting point for future research.
Across a series of three studies we demonstrate that the
individual difference variable of attachment security affects the
representation of instrumental needs differently than social-
emotional distress (Studies 2 and 3). However, this was only
the case when the stimuli were complex and afforded multiple
potential interpretations (Studies 1A, B). Together these results
suggest that attempting to understand and integrate divergent
findings within a single theoretical framework can lead to more
nuanced understanding.
Though these studies approach the question of social reasoning
from a novel perspective, the findings are largely consistent with
existing literature. As predicted by attachment theory we observed
an influence of attachment security on the representation of
social-emotional stimuli (Dykas and Cassidy, 2011), particularly
when the stimuli were complex and afforded multiple construals
(Baldwin, 1992). In addition, these findings are consistent with
a growing body of literature examining the social cognitive
constraints on early other-oriented behaviors; particularly that
the ability to recognize and respond to instrumental needs
emerges prior to, and independent from, the ability to respond
to emotional distress (see Dunfield, 2014, for a review). Further,
these results may help to explain why the ability to provide
instrumental help appears more robust, and earlier emerging,
than the ability to offer social help (Beier et al., 2014). Finally,
these results are consistent with the finding that infants appear
to universally evaluate helpers positively and hinderers negatively
(e.g., Kuhlmeier et al., 2003; Hamlin et al., 2007), while showing
individual differences in their expectations of responsive versus
unresponsive caregivers (Johnson et al., 2007, 2010). Indeed,
by considering both the underlying task demands and bodies
of related research, we can gain insight and support for the
perspective that attributing instrumental goals to agents acting
on objects requires different underlying representations than
attributing social emotional goals to agents acting on other agents
(e.g., Spelke, 2014).
By taking a broad approach to social-cognitive development,
and attempting to integrate a diversity of findings into a
single theoretical account, we demonstrate an important role
for examining how an individual difference variable, such
as attachment security, can influence both similarities and
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differences in social reasoning across individuals. Importantly,
this work represents a first step toward integrating two approaches
that have previously been largely pursued independently. While
inspired by developmental theory and research, these studies
examined university undergraduates, leaving open the question
of when and how early social experiences influence cognitive
development; however, based on existing findings (e.g., Johnson
et al., 2007, 2010) it appears that the reciprocal relations emerge
early.
Though these findings are consistent with previous research,
the mechanisms underlying these differences are unclear. Based
on these studies it is not currently possible to determine whether
it is the content or complexity of the underlying representation
that drives the observed differences. Future work is required to
determine how these different goal construals interact with social
evaluations in order to support behavioral outcomes. For example,
it is possible that the infants in the initial caregiver studies
(Johnson et al., 2007, 2010) were differentially evaluating the
responsive versus unresponsive caregiver because they differed
in the initial goal representation (i.e., some infants attended to
the Baby’s distress while others were attending to the Mommy’s
climb). It is also possible that the goals were construed similarly
(i.e., reunion), however the participants differed, as proposed, in
the type of caregiving responses they expected.
The goal of this paper was to examine more directly the
apparent contradiction between research supporting universal
similarities and individual differences in social reasoning.
Although these two perspectives were often examined separately
by researchers interested in either innate, early-emerging,
universal components of cognition, or researchers interested
in variable social outcomes affected by experience, there is a
growing move to bring these two perspectives back together
(Olson and Dweck, 2008, 2009). While this recombination
may lead to the appearance of contradiction and inconsistency,
we have demonstrated that by addressing the conflict head
on, and using points of tension as starting points for
further investigation, we can work toward a more nuanced
and accurate understanding of the nature of human social
cognition.
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